News
Military Law
Jun. 24, 2002
Ready for Disaster?
Forum Column - By Leslie T. Thornton - In the weeks after Sept. 11, President Bush created a new White House position called director of Homeland Security and tasked former Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge to lead, oversee and coordinate a national campaign against domestic terrorism.
Forum Column
By Leslie T. Thornton
In the weeks after Sept. 11, President Bush created a new White House position called director of Homeland Security and tasked former Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge to lead, oversee and coordinate a national campaign against domestic terrorism. Bush's June 6 announcement proposing the establishment of a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security must reflect Ridge's difficulty accomplishing the security mission with his small White House office and staff.
After months of stealthy analysis and deliberation on the viability of creating this new, massive cabinet-level department, the White House must do more than leave it to Congress to legislate one. The administration must find a way to make it work.
Calling his proposal "the most extensive reorganization of the federal government since the 1940s," when Harry Truman created the Department of Defense, Bush made big news in the middle of an increasingly negative press cycle for the White House. He also has asked the nation's congressional and executive branch leaders to take on one of the toughest governmental and organizational tasks we've faced in 50 years.
Because only Congress can create an executive branch cabinet agency through legislation, much of the news we will hear the remainder of this congressional session likely will be about the inevitable turf battles that 88 separate committees will have over the affected agencies. When the U.S. Department of Education was formed in the 1970s - a much smaller agency less critically related to the nation's infrastructure - major offices like Head Start, Indian Education, and the School Lunch Program remained in the Department of Health and Human Service, the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture, respectively, because interested congressional members and other constituents did not wish their departments moved. Bush's current proposal would move 22 separate agencies or parts of agencies with widely disparate missions into one mammoth mechanism designed to help keep America safe. No one disputes the likelihood of turf and probably legal battles. In times as important as these, good-faith disagreements about how we reach a mutual goal can be critical to the process.
But in the end, a new giant agency will be formed with sweeping powers. And, because of the number and types of agencies involved, they likely will be ill-coordinated powers.
And that's where the rubber will hit the road. Whatever Congress and the White House work out, and don't work out, will directly and importantly affect the operations of the new department. The stakes in getting it right in crafting the enabling legislation, and later in running the agency, may never be greater.
According to Bush, the new department should have four primary tasks: control our borders and prevent terrorists and explosives from entering the country; work with state and local authorities in emergency preparedness and response; develop technologies that detect biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and find drugs and treatment to best protect us; and review intelligence and law enforcement information from all the relevant agencies to produce a single, reliable assessment of threat.
To accomplish these goals, Bush's proposed agency likely would absorb many large-scale operations, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the fledging Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Protective Service, Secret Service and many smaller agencies or subagencies.
Before legislative action, there is no meaningful way to determine whether these four tasks will remain the focus and which agencies will in fact be absorbed by the department, but it is safe to assume the new department will resemble Bush's original plan.
This is a big undertaking. Even under the best of circumstances - with the smallest number of employees, largest number of dollars and the highest amount of interoffice synergy - heading a cabinet-level agency is exceedingly complex. Cabinet heads juggle everything from difficult personnel issues to duplication of services and overlap to political and policy developments to internal and external crisis management to safety to internal and external communication and technology issues. In addition, no matter how well-defined the lines of authority, cabinet secretaries spend a good deal of time quieting their own internal turf battles.
Accordingly, the large Department of Homeland Security will face enormous organizational and operational challenges when there is no time to waste. But there may be ways to minimize some of the inevitable startup missteps.
First, the new department will need an exceedingly strong leader whose qualifications and ability to deliver are almost uniformly unquestioned. This position is an operations job, not a policy position. A leader strong on operational skills must be selected with as much bipartisan support and little politics as is possible in Washington. Many believe Tom Ridge will be the new secretary, but there are lots of signals otherwise, and the seeking-a-cabinet-post game in Washington can be fierce even under normal circumstances. If Ridge doesn't want it, any number of other high-ranking political leaders will want it, which will add more complications to a difficult process.
Perhaps we should consider former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani for the operations position, which will require skills and strength of purpose to make these variant trains run smoothly, stay on the track and make it in on time. If the new secretary does not have both the real and perceived power and respect needed to bring together the strong heads of the affected agencies in a meaningful way, we may just as well chalk this up to an interesting think-tank study on organizational failures.
It is also critical, both to avoid the usual political rancor over Washington jobs and to enable a reasonable transition of the free-standing agencies, that the White House and Congress agree, if they intend to agree, on who will head the department as soon as possible. It is not likely Congress will do this before serious discussions have begun on the actual legislation because they likely will want to interfere. But it is important to send an early signal of strength and unity, or else this new agency will be a bureaucratic quagmire for years to come with holes in it big enough to drive a truck bomb through.
The same must be true for the relevant office heads. Will Brian Stafford, the director of the Secret Service, a nonpolitical appointment exempt from Senate confirmation, become a candidate for a Senate-confirmed assistant secretary appointment? Not likely, but if Stafford's job isn't elevated along with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's director job, will that create department turf wars? And shouldn't James Lee Witt, the former management agency head who orchestrated one of the most successful reorganizations in history, at least be consulted?
Open lines of communication internally and externally must be a primary focus of the new secretary. We have seen the results of interagency communications failures. It will be imperative that the new secretary figure out before he or she begins how the different offices are going to talk to one another, what systems will need to be upgraded or integrated, how long it will take, how much money it will cost and how to get it done quickly and effectively. It should not be acceptable to the new secretary if the Transportation Security Agency's computers can't talk to the Coast Guard's computers, and it should be almost punishable if the Transportation Security Agency can't talk to the Federal Aviation Agency.
Clear lines of authority will be key, as well, because interoffice encroachment is legendary in cabinet agencies.
The new secretary also must figure out before she or he starts how success will be defined. Everyone knows that the primary agencies responsible for national law-enforcement, intelligence gathering and analysis and the overall national protective function - the FBI, CIA and NSA - will not be part of the new department. How then will the new department identify and characterize success? The Secret Service is considered successful every time it moves the president without incident or it arrests a potential assassin. The FBI is successful when it catches a terrorist and averts an incident. What acts or omissions will need to occur before the new department is considered successful?
The new department also will need an exit, or at least a reorganization strategy. What if, five years from now, nothing has happened, there has been no real activity? Will or should the department remain? What if somebody figures out it was a mistake to leave out the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms or to include the National Flood Insurance Program?
In the past, some administrations have had reorganization authority allowing them to move agencies and people around without legislative action. Perhaps the administration should seek this type of authority on behalf of its new department and new secretary.
Leslie T. Thornton, a public policy and litigation partner with Patton Boggs in Washington, D.C., was secretary of Education chief of staff under President Clinton and chief policy and political liaison to the Clinton White House. The views expressed are hers alone.
By Leslie T. Thornton
In the weeks after Sept. 11, President Bush created a new White House position called director of Homeland Security and tasked former Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge to lead, oversee and coordinate a national campaign against domestic terrorism. Bush's June 6 announcement proposing the establishment of a cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security must reflect Ridge's difficulty accomplishing the security mission with his small White House office and staff.
After months of stealthy analysis and deliberation on the viability of creating this new, massive cabinet-level department, the White House must do more than leave it to Congress to legislate one. The administration must find a way to make it work.
Calling his proposal "the most extensive reorganization of the federal government since the 1940s," when Harry Truman created the Department of Defense, Bush made big news in the middle of an increasingly negative press cycle for the White House. He also has asked the nation's congressional and executive branch leaders to take on one of the toughest governmental and organizational tasks we've faced in 50 years.
Because only Congress can create an executive branch cabinet agency through legislation, much of the news we will hear the remainder of this congressional session likely will be about the inevitable turf battles that 88 separate committees will have over the affected agencies. When the U.S. Department of Education was formed in the 1970s - a much smaller agency less critically related to the nation's infrastructure - major offices like Head Start, Indian Education, and the School Lunch Program remained in the Department of Health and Human Service, the Department of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture, respectively, because interested congressional members and other constituents did not wish their departments moved. Bush's current proposal would move 22 separate agencies or parts of agencies with widely disparate missions into one mammoth mechanism designed to help keep America safe. No one disputes the likelihood of turf and probably legal battles. In times as important as these, good-faith disagreements about how we reach a mutual goal can be critical to the process.
But in the end, a new giant agency will be formed with sweeping powers. And, because of the number and types of agencies involved, they likely will be ill-coordinated powers.
And that's where the rubber will hit the road. Whatever Congress and the White House work out, and don't work out, will directly and importantly affect the operations of the new department. The stakes in getting it right in crafting the enabling legislation, and later in running the agency, may never be greater.
According to Bush, the new department should have four primary tasks: control our borders and prevent terrorists and explosives from entering the country; work with state and local authorities in emergency preparedness and response; develop technologies that detect biological, chemical and nuclear weapons and find drugs and treatment to best protect us; and review intelligence and law enforcement information from all the relevant agencies to produce a single, reliable assessment of threat.
To accomplish these goals, Bush's proposed agency likely would absorb many large-scale operations, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the fledging Transportation Security Administration, the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Federal Protective Service, Secret Service and many smaller agencies or subagencies.
Before legislative action, there is no meaningful way to determine whether these four tasks will remain the focus and which agencies will in fact be absorbed by the department, but it is safe to assume the new department will resemble Bush's original plan.
This is a big undertaking. Even under the best of circumstances - with the smallest number of employees, largest number of dollars and the highest amount of interoffice synergy - heading a cabinet-level agency is exceedingly complex. Cabinet heads juggle everything from difficult personnel issues to duplication of services and overlap to political and policy developments to internal and external crisis management to safety to internal and external communication and technology issues. In addition, no matter how well-defined the lines of authority, cabinet secretaries spend a good deal of time quieting their own internal turf battles.
Accordingly, the large Department of Homeland Security will face enormous organizational and operational challenges when there is no time to waste. But there may be ways to minimize some of the inevitable startup missteps.
First, the new department will need an exceedingly strong leader whose qualifications and ability to deliver are almost uniformly unquestioned. This position is an operations job, not a policy position. A leader strong on operational skills must be selected with as much bipartisan support and little politics as is possible in Washington. Many believe Tom Ridge will be the new secretary, but there are lots of signals otherwise, and the seeking-a-cabinet-post game in Washington can be fierce even under normal circumstances. If Ridge doesn't want it, any number of other high-ranking political leaders will want it, which will add more complications to a difficult process.
Perhaps we should consider former New York Mayor Rudy Giuliani for the operations position, which will require skills and strength of purpose to make these variant trains run smoothly, stay on the track and make it in on time. If the new secretary does not have both the real and perceived power and respect needed to bring together the strong heads of the affected agencies in a meaningful way, we may just as well chalk this up to an interesting think-tank study on organizational failures.
It is also critical, both to avoid the usual political rancor over Washington jobs and to enable a reasonable transition of the free-standing agencies, that the White House and Congress agree, if they intend to agree, on who will head the department as soon as possible. It is not likely Congress will do this before serious discussions have begun on the actual legislation because they likely will want to interfere. But it is important to send an early signal of strength and unity, or else this new agency will be a bureaucratic quagmire for years to come with holes in it big enough to drive a truck bomb through.
The same must be true for the relevant office heads. Will Brian Stafford, the director of the Secret Service, a nonpolitical appointment exempt from Senate confirmation, become a candidate for a Senate-confirmed assistant secretary appointment? Not likely, but if Stafford's job isn't elevated along with the Federal Emergency Management Agency's director job, will that create department turf wars? And shouldn't James Lee Witt, the former management agency head who orchestrated one of the most successful reorganizations in history, at least be consulted?
Open lines of communication internally and externally must be a primary focus of the new secretary. We have seen the results of interagency communications failures. It will be imperative that the new secretary figure out before he or she begins how the different offices are going to talk to one another, what systems will need to be upgraded or integrated, how long it will take, how much money it will cost and how to get it done quickly and effectively. It should not be acceptable to the new secretary if the Transportation Security Agency's computers can't talk to the Coast Guard's computers, and it should be almost punishable if the Transportation Security Agency can't talk to the Federal Aviation Agency.
Clear lines of authority will be key, as well, because interoffice encroachment is legendary in cabinet agencies.
The new secretary also must figure out before she or he starts how success will be defined. Everyone knows that the primary agencies responsible for national law-enforcement, intelligence gathering and analysis and the overall national protective function - the FBI, CIA and NSA - will not be part of the new department. How then will the new department identify and characterize success? The Secret Service is considered successful every time it moves the president without incident or it arrests a potential assassin. The FBI is successful when it catches a terrorist and averts an incident. What acts or omissions will need to occur before the new department is considered successful?
The new department also will need an exit, or at least a reorganization strategy. What if, five years from now, nothing has happened, there has been no real activity? Will or should the department remain? What if somebody figures out it was a mistake to leave out the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms or to include the National Flood Insurance Program?
In the past, some administrations have had reorganization authority allowing them to move agencies and people around without legislative action. Perhaps the administration should seek this type of authority on behalf of its new department and new secretary.
Leslie T. Thornton, a public policy and litigation partner with Patton Boggs in Washington, D.C., was secretary of Education chief of staff under President Clinton and chief policy and political liaison to the Clinton White House. The views expressed are hers alone.
#337298
Columnist
Daily Journal Staff Writer
For reprint rights or to order a copy of your photo:
Email
Jeremy_Ellis@dailyjournal.com
for prices.
Direct dial: 213-229-5424
Send a letter to the editor:
Email: letters@dailyjournal.com