News
Criminal
Feb. 25, 2002
Law Helps Battered Women in Jail for Killing Abusers
Focus Column - By Alex Ricciardulli - Gov. Gray Davis and the Legislature have taken steps over the last few years to ensure that only truly guilty people populate the state's prisons. Two years ago, a bill was passed and signed into law that gave defendants the opportunity to overturn their convictions on the basis of newly developed DNA testing technology. Penal Code Section 1405.
Focus Column
By Alex Ricciardulli
Gov. Gray Davis and the Legislature have taken steps over the last few years to ensure that only truly guilty people populate the state's prisons. Two years ago, a bill was passed and signed into law that gave defendants the opportunity to overturn their convictions on the basis of newly developed DNA testing technology. Penal Code Section 1405.
Last year, Davis signed a bill enacting Penal Code Section 1473.5. This bill was directed at a different group of people: Women suffering from battered women's syndrome who were convicted of murder in cases where evidence of the syndrome was not presented.
The new statute, created by SB799 and sponsored by state Sen. Betty Karnette, went into effect Jan. 1. The law allows women to file writs of habeas corpus to overturn their murder convictions in cases where the killings involved abuse by the victim of the homicide.
The statute only applies to women convicted before 1992. This cut-off date was selected because this was when Evidence Code Section 1107, expressly allowing evidence of the syndrome to be presented in trials, became effective.
Thus the law has far narrower applicability than last year's DNA statute, which did not specify any time limit. In fact, the Legislature estimated that fewer than 50 women are in prison who could be eligible for relief under the law. Assembly Committee on Appropriations, Report on SB799 (Aug. 22, 2001).
Yet the path to even getting this limited reform enacted was torturous, to say the least. Understanding the syndrome and its application to criminal cases is critical to appreciating the importance of the law.
The syndrome has been defined as "a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives." People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal.4th 1073 (1996). Section 1107(a) allows evidence to be admitted regarding "the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence."
The syndrome can be used as both a shield and a sword. The new law assists women in defending against charges, but prosecutors often use this type of evidence in proving that male defendants committed violent crimes against victims suffering from the syndrome.
For example, the syndrome helps refute claims that if the violence at issue had really occurred, the woman would have left the man long ago. It also helps explain why women often disavow their allegations that the man inflicted the abuse. The syndrome "includes the tendency of a victim to recant in order to protect the batterer and rationalize a victim's decision to resume the relationship." Thus, this "evidence speaks directly to both recantation and reunion by a domestic abuse victim." People v. Gadlin, 78 Cal.App.4th 587 (2000).
As a shield, this evidence can prove invaluable to a woman charged with a crime like murder, helping establish that the woman acted in self-defense, which would completely exonerate her, or imperfect self-defense, which can reduce murder to manslaughter, thereby greatly decreasing a sentence. (Murder carries a sentence of up to 25 years to life, while the maximum for manslaughter is 11 years.)
"To be exculpated on a theory of self-defense one must have an honest and reasonable belief in the need to defend." People v. Flannel, 25 Cal.3d 668 (1979). If the belief subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, this constitutes imperfect self-defense, in which case "the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder, but can be convicted of manslaughter." In re Christian S., 7 Cal.4th 768 (1994). The syndrome is probative regarding both the honesty and reasonableness prongs of these defenses.
The syndrome is "highly relevant to the first element of self-defense - defendant's actual, subjective perception that she was in danger and that she had to kill her husband to avoid that danger. ... [The syndrome explains] how such a perception would reasonably follow from the defendant's experience as a battered woman. This relates to the prosecution's argument that such a perception of imminent danger makes no sense when the victim is asleep and a way of escape open and, therefore, she did not actually have that perception." Humphrey.
Regarding the second prong, Humphrey explained that "the jury, in determining objective reasonableness, must view the situation from the defendant's perspective." An expert on the syndrome can thus properly testify that "[a]s violence increases over time, and threats gain credibility, a battered person might become sensitized and thus able reasonably to discern when danger is real and when it is not. [T]he expert's testimony might also enable the jury to find that the battered [woman] ... is particularly able to predict accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her. That conclusion could significantly affect the jury's evaluation of the reasonableness of defendant's fear for her life."
Prior to Section 1107's enactment, getting this evidence admitted in a case was a hit-and-miss affair. Some trial courts admitted the evidence, but others refused, finding that the testimony was not generally accepted in the scientific community. The 1992 statute changed this by specifically providing that the syndrome "shall not be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven."
The new habeas corpus bill provides relief for cases from before 1992 where this evidence could have been admitted but was not. To obtain a new trial or an outright dismissal, the woman must show that she was convicted of murder before 1992; that she suffered from the syndrome due to abuse by the murder victim; that syndrome evidence was not admitted at the trial; and that the evidence "is of such substance that, had it been introduced, there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction, that the result would have been different." The statute expires Jan. 1, 2005, so women affected by its provisions need to act before then.
One question that comes to mind is why did it take the Legislature so long to enact a remedy? Attempts to promulgate a law actually date back to the year after Section 1107 was enacted. Yet perhaps because of residual hostility to this type of evidence, it took until last year for a remedial statute to be enacted.
In 1993, AB2295 was introduced to address the problem. At the time, the Legislature estimated that there were "approximately 650 women who were convicted of killing or assaulting their abusive husbands prior to the legal community recognizing the relevance of battered woman's syndrome evidence." Assembly Committee on Public Safety, Report on AB2295 (May 18, 1993). However, Gov. Pete Wilson vetoed the bill.
In 1995, then-Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl introduced AB1211, which was substantially identical to the current habeas law, providing habeas relief to women convicted of murder who suffered from the syndrome. The bill still did not get very far: It failed even to make it out of committee.
AB1628 again was introduced in the 1997-1998 session to enact the habeas remedy. This one died when it was amended in the Assembly to delete the habeas statute and insert health care regulations.
The Legislature provided some relief in 2000 when it enacted SB499, sponsored by Sen. John Burton. This bill approached the problem from a different angle, trying to encourage the release on parole of women serving life sentences for crimes involving the syndrome.
The bill amended Penal Code Section 4801 to provide that when a woman serving a life sentence is being considered for parole, the Board of Prison Terms must "consider any information or evidence that, at the time of the commission of the crime, the prisoner had suffered from battered woman syndrome, but was convicted of the offense prior to the enactment of Section 1107 of the Evidence Code." The bill was approved by Gov. Davis and thus became law.
Encouraged by this success, Karnette introduced the new habeas legislation the very next year. Davis approved the bill in Oct. 2001.
The road to relief for convicted women with battered women's syndrome took nearly 10 years. All the while, the defendants sat in prison awaiting their day in court. The new habeas law will hopefully help women who were locked up without the opportunity to show that the real victim in their cases was the person that was charged with the crime.
Alex Ricciardulli is a deputy public defender assigned to the appellate branch of the Los Angeles County public defender's office.
By Alex Ricciardulli
Gov. Gray Davis and the Legislature have taken steps over the last few years to ensure that only truly guilty people populate the state's prisons. Two years ago, a bill was passed and signed into law that gave defendants the opportunity to overturn their convictions on the basis of newly developed DNA testing technology. Penal Code Section 1405.
Last year, Davis signed a bill enacting Penal Code Section 1473.5. This bill was directed at a different group of people: Women suffering from battered women's syndrome who were convicted of murder in cases where evidence of the syndrome was not presented.
The new statute, created by SB799 and sponsored by state Sen. Betty Karnette, went into effect Jan. 1. The law allows women to file writs of habeas corpus to overturn their murder convictions in cases where the killings involved abuse by the victim of the homicide.
The statute only applies to women convicted before 1992. This cut-off date was selected because this was when Evidence Code Section 1107, expressly allowing evidence of the syndrome to be presented in trials, became effective.
Thus the law has far narrower applicability than last year's DNA statute, which did not specify any time limit. In fact, the Legislature estimated that fewer than 50 women are in prison who could be eligible for relief under the law. Assembly Committee on Appropriations, Report on SB799 (Aug. 22, 2001).
Yet the path to even getting this limited reform enacted was torturous, to say the least. Understanding the syndrome and its application to criminal cases is critical to appreciating the importance of the law.
The syndrome has been defined as "a series of common characteristics that appear in women who are abused physically and psychologically over an extended period of time by the dominant male figure in their lives." People v. Humphrey, 13 Cal.4th 1073 (1996). Section 1107(a) allows evidence to be admitted regarding "the physical, emotional, or mental effects upon the beliefs, perceptions, or behavior of victims of domestic violence."
The syndrome can be used as both a shield and a sword. The new law assists women in defending against charges, but prosecutors often use this type of evidence in proving that male defendants committed violent crimes against victims suffering from the syndrome.
For example, the syndrome helps refute claims that if the violence at issue had really occurred, the woman would have left the man long ago. It also helps explain why women often disavow their allegations that the man inflicted the abuse. The syndrome "includes the tendency of a victim to recant in order to protect the batterer and rationalize a victim's decision to resume the relationship." Thus, this "evidence speaks directly to both recantation and reunion by a domestic abuse victim." People v. Gadlin, 78 Cal.App.4th 587 (2000).
As a shield, this evidence can prove invaluable to a woman charged with a crime like murder, helping establish that the woman acted in self-defense, which would completely exonerate her, or imperfect self-defense, which can reduce murder to manslaughter, thereby greatly decreasing a sentence. (Murder carries a sentence of up to 25 years to life, while the maximum for manslaughter is 11 years.)
"To be exculpated on a theory of self-defense one must have an honest and reasonable belief in the need to defend." People v. Flannel, 25 Cal.3d 668 (1979). If the belief subjectively exists but is objectively unreasonable, this constitutes imperfect self-defense, in which case "the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and cannot be convicted of murder, but can be convicted of manslaughter." In re Christian S., 7 Cal.4th 768 (1994). The syndrome is probative regarding both the honesty and reasonableness prongs of these defenses.
The syndrome is "highly relevant to the first element of self-defense - defendant's actual, subjective perception that she was in danger and that she had to kill her husband to avoid that danger. ... [The syndrome explains] how such a perception would reasonably follow from the defendant's experience as a battered woman. This relates to the prosecution's argument that such a perception of imminent danger makes no sense when the victim is asleep and a way of escape open and, therefore, she did not actually have that perception." Humphrey.
Regarding the second prong, Humphrey explained that "the jury, in determining objective reasonableness, must view the situation from the defendant's perspective." An expert on the syndrome can thus properly testify that "[a]s violence increases over time, and threats gain credibility, a battered person might become sensitized and thus able reasonably to discern when danger is real and when it is not. [T]he expert's testimony might also enable the jury to find that the battered [woman] ... is particularly able to predict accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her. That conclusion could significantly affect the jury's evaluation of the reasonableness of defendant's fear for her life."
Prior to Section 1107's enactment, getting this evidence admitted in a case was a hit-and-miss affair. Some trial courts admitted the evidence, but others refused, finding that the testimony was not generally accepted in the scientific community. The 1992 statute changed this by specifically providing that the syndrome "shall not be considered a new scientific technique whose reliability is unproven."
The new habeas corpus bill provides relief for cases from before 1992 where this evidence could have been admitted but was not. To obtain a new trial or an outright dismissal, the woman must show that she was convicted of murder before 1992; that she suffered from the syndrome due to abuse by the murder victim; that syndrome evidence was not admitted at the trial; and that the evidence "is of such substance that, had it been introduced, there is a reasonable probability, sufficient to undermine confidence in the judgment of conviction, that the result would have been different." The statute expires Jan. 1, 2005, so women affected by its provisions need to act before then.
One question that comes to mind is why did it take the Legislature so long to enact a remedy? Attempts to promulgate a law actually date back to the year after Section 1107 was enacted. Yet perhaps because of residual hostility to this type of evidence, it took until last year for a remedial statute to be enacted.
In 1993, AB2295 was introduced to address the problem. At the time, the Legislature estimated that there were "approximately 650 women who were convicted of killing or assaulting their abusive husbands prior to the legal community recognizing the relevance of battered woman's syndrome evidence." Assembly Committee on Public Safety, Report on AB2295 (May 18, 1993). However, Gov. Pete Wilson vetoed the bill.
In 1995, then-Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl introduced AB1211, which was substantially identical to the current habeas law, providing habeas relief to women convicted of murder who suffered from the syndrome. The bill still did not get very far: It failed even to make it out of committee.
AB1628 again was introduced in the 1997-1998 session to enact the habeas remedy. This one died when it was amended in the Assembly to delete the habeas statute and insert health care regulations.
The Legislature provided some relief in 2000 when it enacted SB499, sponsored by Sen. John Burton. This bill approached the problem from a different angle, trying to encourage the release on parole of women serving life sentences for crimes involving the syndrome.
The bill amended Penal Code Section 4801 to provide that when a woman serving a life sentence is being considered for parole, the Board of Prison Terms must "consider any information or evidence that, at the time of the commission of the crime, the prisoner had suffered from battered woman syndrome, but was convicted of the offense prior to the enactment of Section 1107 of the Evidence Code." The bill was approved by Gov. Davis and thus became law.
Encouraged by this success, Karnette introduced the new habeas legislation the very next year. Davis approved the bill in Oct. 2001.
The road to relief for convicted women with battered women's syndrome took nearly 10 years. All the while, the defendants sat in prison awaiting their day in court. The new habeas law will hopefully help women who were locked up without the opportunity to show that the real victim in their cases was the person that was charged with the crime.
Alex Ricciardulli is a deputy public defender assigned to the appellate branch of the Los Angeles County public defender's office.
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