Whether a prior conviction is a serious felony for "three strikes" purposes is a question of law.
Cite as
1998 DJDAR 8949Published
Feb. 9, 2000Filing Date
Aug. 18, 1998
ORDER
Review Granted
PEOPLE, Respondent v. ALAN R. KIDD, Appellant No. S071352 C.A. 2nd, Div 5, No. B106003 California Supreme Court Filed August 19, 1998 Petition for review GRANTED.
Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Kelii, S070960 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.2(c)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 29.3 is deferred pending further order of the court.
[Editor's Note - For your convenience we reprint below the Daily Journal's Ruling column brief which summarized the earlier decision of the lower court.]
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Whether a prior conviction is a serious felony for "three strikes" purposes is a question of law.
The C.A. 2nd has held, in the published portion of the opinion, that for "three strikes" sentencing purposes, the issue of whether a prior felony was a serious or violent felony is a question of law to be determined by the court.
Alan Kidd was charged with the murder of Lola Ramirez. It was alleged that Kidd used a knife in that murder. It was further alleged that he had two prior serious felony convictions. Kidd pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A jury found that Kidd had committed the murders with a knife, that he was not insane, and that he had two prior serious felony convictions. Previously, in 1988, Kidd had been convicted of "assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury." The trial court used this prior serious felony conviction and another to triple Kidd's minimum 15 year sentence to a minimum of 45 years. The court also added a three year enhancement and two separate 5 year enhancements to Kidd's sentence. Kidd contended that there was no evidence to support a jury finding that his 1988 prior conviction was for a serious felony.
The C.A. 2nd affirmed. The U.S. Constitution does not entitle a criminal defendant to have a jury determine any aspect of his or her sentence. "In general, 'there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentencing turns on specific findings of fact.' " The California Constitution does not give a defendant the right to have a "jury determine the truth of prior conviction allegations that relate to sentencing." California, and a few other states, have statutorily granted defendants the right to have juries determine the truth of prior conviction allegations; however, these statutes are quite limited in applicability. By their terms, the statutes only allow the jury to determine if the defendant has in fact "suffered" the alleged prior conviction. "Questions concerning prior conviction sentence enhancements that are largely legal in nature and depend upon the interpretation of complex and detailed provisions of California criminal procedure are properly matters for the court to determine." Questions of whether alleged prior felony convictions qualify as serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the sentencing laws are legal in nature and require interpretation of complex and detailed provisions of law. "A jury cannot reasonably be expected to wade through this morass of Penal Code sections." The determinations whether Kidd's prior convictions counted as serious or violent felonies were for the court, not the jury. The jury's finding that Kidd had suffered the previous convictions was enough to support the sentence enhancements. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Challenges to the conduct of both the court and the prosecution during the sanity phase of the trial were also rejected. Finally, the use of Kidd's prior felony convictions both to triple his minimum sentence and to support the five year enhancements was approved on authority of People v. Dotson.
People v. Kidd, No. B106003, filed April 27,. 1998, by Grignon, J.
The full text of this case appears in 98 Daily Journal DAR 4323, April 29, 1998.
Review Granted
PEOPLE, Respondent v. ALAN R. KIDD, Appellant No. S071352 C.A. 2nd, Div 5, No. B106003 California Supreme Court Filed August 19, 1998 Petition for review GRANTED.
Further action in this matter is deferred pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in People v. Kelii, S070960 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 29.2(c)), or pending further order of the court. Submission of additional briefing, pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 29.3 is deferred pending further order of the court.
GEORGE, Chief Justice
MOSK, Associate Justice
BAXTER, Associate Justice
WERDEGAR, Associate Justice
CHIN, Associate Justice
BROWN, Associate Justice
[Editor's Note - For your convenience we reprint below the Daily Journal's Ruling column brief which summarized the earlier decision of the lower court.]
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Whether a prior conviction is a serious felony for "three strikes" purposes is a question of law.
The C.A. 2nd has held, in the published portion of the opinion, that for "three strikes" sentencing purposes, the issue of whether a prior felony was a serious or violent felony is a question of law to be determined by the court.
Alan Kidd was charged with the murder of Lola Ramirez. It was alleged that Kidd used a knife in that murder. It was further alleged that he had two prior serious felony convictions. Kidd pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. A jury found that Kidd had committed the murders with a knife, that he was not insane, and that he had two prior serious felony convictions. Previously, in 1988, Kidd had been convicted of "assault with a deadly weapon or by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury." The trial court used this prior serious felony conviction and another to triple Kidd's minimum 15 year sentence to a minimum of 45 years. The court also added a three year enhancement and two separate 5 year enhancements to Kidd's sentence. Kidd contended that there was no evidence to support a jury finding that his 1988 prior conviction was for a serious felony.
The C.A. 2nd affirmed. The U.S. Constitution does not entitle a criminal defendant to have a jury determine any aspect of his or her sentence. "In general, 'there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentencing turns on specific findings of fact.' " The California Constitution does not give a defendant the right to have a "jury determine the truth of prior conviction allegations that relate to sentencing." California, and a few other states, have statutorily granted defendants the right to have juries determine the truth of prior conviction allegations; however, these statutes are quite limited in applicability. By their terms, the statutes only allow the jury to determine if the defendant has in fact "suffered" the alleged prior conviction. "Questions concerning prior conviction sentence enhancements that are largely legal in nature and depend upon the interpretation of complex and detailed provisions of California criminal procedure are properly matters for the court to determine." Questions of whether alleged prior felony convictions qualify as serious or violent felonies within the meaning of the sentencing laws are legal in nature and require interpretation of complex and detailed provisions of law. "A jury cannot reasonably be expected to wade through this morass of Penal Code sections." The determinations whether Kidd's prior convictions counted as serious or violent felonies were for the court, not the jury. The jury's finding that Kidd had suffered the previous convictions was enough to support the sentence enhancements. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court affirmed the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense. Challenges to the conduct of both the court and the prosecution during the sanity phase of the trial were also rejected. Finally, the use of Kidd's prior felony convictions both to triple his minimum sentence and to support the five year enhancements was approved on authority of People v. Dotson.
People v. Kidd, No. B106003, filed April 27,. 1998, by Grignon, J.
The full text of this case appears in 98 Daily Journal DAR 4323, April 29, 1998.
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